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Introduction 
The aim of this conceptual paper is to help stimulate further research and enquiry into UK Port Resilience 
and is a product of the EPSRC funded Knowledge Transfer Collaboration between the University of 
Nottingham and the Department for Transport (DfT). The paper draws on collaborative work between the 
authors and senior policy makers within the DfT, as well as on workshops, meetings and an extensive 
interview series with members of the UK’s port sector in order to address four key questions: 
 How important are ports for the UK? 
 How vulnerable are UK ports? 
 How do ports currently prepare themselves against vulnerabilities? 
 How can port resilience be improved? 
Interim drafts of the paper were also circulated across Whitehall for further comment and input. The views 
presented in this paper as well as any errors or misrepresentations remain those of the authors alone.  
1 How important are ports for the UK? 
The UK is an island and ports play a significant feature within its economy. They help tie the UK to global 
markets and provide access to critical supplies. In light of prevailing lean management practices and just-
in-time type operations, it is thought that a disruption at one (or several) of the UK’s major ports is likely to 
quickly ripple down the supply chain with immediate impact upon manufacturing and production. In 
severe cases, such as a tidal surge, prolonged port disruptions are also thought to have a direct impact 
on daily life, especially if access to critical supplies in energy and food is severely limited or cut-off. 
UK ports cater for about 95% of the UK’s foreign trade. In tonnage terms that trade amounts to a handling 
of 519 million tonnes in 2011
1
.Of this tonnage 46% is in liquid form, mainly gas, oil and oil products; 20% 
can be classified as dry bulk-cargo, such as cereals, coal and cement; 11% is in containers, usually of a 
higher value or time-critical, such as consumer goods, textiles, and perishables (e.g. meat and 
vegetables).19% of the UK’s maritime trade comes in Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO) units, such as trucks and 
truck trailers, mostly between the UK and its European neighbours (DfT 2012).  
Although the UK has about 1040 ports, 120 are described by the Department for Transport as 
commercially active and 52 are viewed as “major ports
2
 and handling 97 per cent of the UK’s maritime 
traffic (507 Mt). The top ten ports carry 69% of the UK maritime traffic (in tonnage terms) and most types 
of maritime traffic tends to be concentrated on less than a handful of ports (DfT 2012). For example, in oil 
and gas, containers, and dry-bulk shipping the largest port operates at or close to twice the tonnage (or 
units) as its nearest competitor, sometime significantly more (Figure 1).  
                                                     
1
 In comparison, airfreight landed at UK airports in 2011 was just shy of 2.3 million tonnes (CAA 2011, 
Table 13.2); the Eurotunnel Group operating the channel tunnel carried in 2011 the equivalent of 16.4 
million tonnes in cars and coaches, and 1.32 million tonnes in rail freight (Eurotunnel Group 2013). 
2
 These are ports handling over one million tonnes per year, and a small number of other key ports. 
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Moreover, ports often have a deep symbiotic relationship with production facilities that co-locate within 
their premises. One example of such symbiotic relationship are the oil and gas refineries at the ports of 
Milford Haven and Southampton, handling 34.4% of the UK’s oil and gas traffic (Figure 1a). Likewise, the 
port of Immingham is very significant for UK coal imports, 19.9% (Figure 1b); and Dover’s capacity to 
handle and turn around car-passenger ships, 41.5% (Figure 1e) dominates the ferry passenger business. 
While the current level of specialisation and scale helps keep costs per unit or tonne down, and helps UK 
ports compete effectively with other European ports for traffic
3
, it does limit the choice of alternative port 
options (if any). In the event of a failure at any one of the UK’s dominant ports, it is unlikely that sufficient 
spare capacity can be found to replace the loss in capacity in full. In some cases, where ships and port 
equipment have been developed hand-in-hand (such as the berthing facilities at Dover, designed to 
accommodate the supper-ferries on the Dover-Calais route) there are likely to be no alternative choice in 
the short to mid-term.  
Figure 1: Key port statistics, top 5 ports for selected traffic types: 2011 
(a)  Major ports: all oil and 
gas traffic 
Thousand 
tonnes 
Percent  
(b)  Major ports: dry-bulk  
traffic 
Thousand 
tonnes 
Percent 
Milford Haven 47,866 21.9    Grimsby & Immingham 20,566 19.9 
Southampton 25,106 11.5    London 11,630 11.3 
Forth 22,848 10.5    Liverpool 8,108 7.8 
Tees and Hartlepool 20,495 9.4    Clyde 7,564 7.3 
Grimsby & Immingham 20,314 9.3    Port Talbot 7,051 6.8 
All major UK ports 218,547 100    All UK major ports 103,408 100 
(c)  All goods vehicle and 
unaccompanied trailer 
traffic 
Thousand 
units 
Percent 
  
(d) All container traffic 
Thousand 
units 
Percent 
Dover 2,049 32.7    Felixstowe 1,980 40.2  
Grimsby & Immingham 522 8.3    Southampton 965 19.6  
Liverpool 441 7.0    London 429 8.7  
Belfast 357 5.7    Liverpool 404 8.2  
London 334 5.3    Medway 240 4.9  
All ports of United 
Kingdom 6,272 100    All ports of United Kingdom 4,927 100  
(e)  All ports: accompanied 
passenger cars 
Thousand 
units 
Percent 
 
(f) Ship arrivals (2009) 
Number 
of 
vessels 
Percent 
Dover 2,565 41.5  Dover 20,127  15.5 
Portsmouth 697 11.3  London 8,616  6.6 
Holyhead 452 7.3  Liverpool 8,489  6.6 
Belfast 270 4.4  Grimsby & Immingham 7,923  6.1 
Stranraer 217 3.5  Belfast 5,623  4.3 
All ports of United 
Kingdom 6,188 100   All ports of United Kingdom 129,587  100 
 
Adapted from Tables 0103 and 0302, Maritime Statistics Compendium 
Source: (Department for Transport 2011, 2012) 
There are many further examples of where the UK is highly dependent on UK ports for specific types of 
goods, which may not necessarily be immediately apparent in current statistical reporting but will be 
known to the ports and shippers concerned. For example, the port of Portsmouth handles 70 per cent of 
                                                     
3
 In comparison to other European countries the tonnage handled in the UK is right at the top, almost on 
equal footing with the Netherlands (DfT 2012) 
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all the bananas eaten in Britain as well as all Moroccan citrus fruit (Portsmouth Port 2013). The Tate & 
Lyle Sugars Refinery at Silvertown on the Thames – located within the wider Port of London river system 
– has a cane-sugar refining capacity of 1.2 million tonnes per year and is one of the largest cane-sugar 
refiners in the world. It caters for much of the UK’s and EU’s sugar demand (Port of London Authority 
2010; Tate & Lyle Sugars 2013). 
Unfortunately, detailed sector studies examining their dependencies on specific ports are rare. One 
notable exception is a study commissioned by DEFRA. It highlights that London, Liverpool and 
Felixstowe handle 60% of all UK food imports received from non-EU country of origins, carried by a 
variety of shipping modes (bulk, break bulk, container and RoRo). The report also suggests – reflecting 
on the fact that significant UK accompanied and unaccompanied trailer traffic (much of it refrigerated) at 
Dover and the Channel Tunnel, and to a lesser extent the Humber ports and London –  that these three 
ports handle the majority of food imports from EU countries (Peter Baker and Andrew Morgan 2012). 
Considering that the UK imports about 50% of its food of which 91% comes in by sea (DEFRA 2010), it is 
fair to assert that the resilience of the UK’s ports in terms of safeguarding UK food supply is of particular 
public interest. 
Further detailed industry studies would be desirable, though the prevalent use of containers in today’s 
global production system does suggest a particularly high dependency on ports catering for container 
traffic – especially Felixstowe and Southampton (Figure 1d). For example, as illustrated in Figure 2, 
72.6% of all UK textile imports
4
 enter the UK via these two ports. 
Figure 2: Textile imports falling under tariff Chapters 50-63 by port in million tonnes, 2011 
Port Million tonnes Percentage 
Felixstowe 754.5 45.3 
Southampton      453.3  27.3 
All Sea and Airports   1,662.4  100 
(Source: extracted from the UKtradeinfo.com database) 
Unfortunately, very little research has been conducted to assess the UK’s current berth and port terminal 
capacity or the respective operator’s reliance upon specialist handling equipment. Policy makers currently 
rely on anecdotal evidence and their personal knowledge of the sector when making judgement about 
critical equipment and spare capacity, if any. Further research, perhaps a national inventory of port 
capacity and critical port resources, would be desirable. 
It also needs to be noted that ports do not only serve ships and trade, they are also locations at which 
many people work and reside as well as choose to spend their leisure time. The Port of London, to give 
one extreme example, extends along the entire tidal Thames and at its boundaries has the world’s main 
financial centre – Canary Wharf – and just a little bit further upstream, the Houses of Parliament. The tidal 
                                                     
4
 Import figures shown in Figure 2 do not include any arrivals of textiles from within the EU. 
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Thames is also the location for the annual Oxford-Cambridge Boat Race and the location at which many 
choose to moor and sail their private yachts and leisure boats. 
Key-point summary 
 The UK has around 1040 ports of which 120 are commercially active. The top 10 ports account 
for 69% of all UK port traffic by tonnage. Most large ports are highly specialised and the largest 
of which often handles twice as much cargo (if not more) in its respective area of specialisation 
(e.g. oil, gas, containers, and ferries) as its nearest competitor. 
 In the absence of any alternative transport capacities (such as air or rail) the UK, as an island 
and net importer, is very dependent upon its ports. 
 Policy makers currently rely on anecdotal evidence and their personal experience of the maritime 
transport and port sector when making judgement about critical equipment and spare capacity. 
Further research, perhaps a national inventory of port capacity and critical port resources, would 
be desirable. 
 In addition to supporting trade and access to goods and products, ports are also places where 
many people choose to reside and spend their leisure time. An extreme example is the Port of 
London, which at its boundaries includes Canary Wharf and the Houses of Parliament. 
 
2 How vulnerable are UK ports? 
The Cabinet Office (2013) highlights in its National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies a wide range of 
scenarios with impact on the UK’s national security (Figures 3a/b). They include tidal surges, industrial 
actions, fuel shortages, industrial accidents, the pandemic flu, and severe weather, amongst others. 
Cyber Security (Cabinet Office 2011) and Space Weather (Cannon 2013) are also seen amongst policy 
makers as significant sources of threat to the UK’s critical infrastructure. Ports and their reliance on 
electronic systems and technology in operations – especially in communication, navigation and 
automation – are thought to be particularly vulnerable
5
. 
In practice, many things can go wrong in a port and extend significantly beyond the cursory risk 
indications made by the Cabinet Office and other UK policy makers. For example, when 18 UK Port 
Harbour Masters were asked in a survey (conducted by this paper’s authors) at their 2012 annual Port 
Harbour Masters conference to list the top 5 scenarios for complete port closure or severe disruption in 
order of likelihood, a wide diversity of issues were raised. The main three being: I) a blockage in the 
marine access channel caused by, for example, a marine accident or the grounding of a ship; II) poor 
weather, such as prolonged strong winds, fog and ice, as well as natural disasters, such as a flood; and  
III) the failure of infrastructure and breakdowns, such as damage to cranes and quays. Further issues 
raised include industrial action, fire, terrorism, oil pollution, financial collapse and the loss of business 
(traffic) as well as the flu and other epidemics (Figure 4). Interestingly, under the label of “Other” 
                                                     
5
 Though awareness of cyber security threats and adverse space weather outside of Whitehall is still 
thought to be poor. 
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reference was also made to port access issues caused by suicides from a bridge onto the main highway 
linking to the port, as well as loss of quay space subsequent to the arrest of a calling ship. 
Figure 3a: High consequence risks facing the United Kingdom: Risk of terrorist and other 
malicious attacks 
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Figure 3b: High consequence risks facing the United Kingdom: Other risks 
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Figure 4: UK port harbour masters’ survey findings, 2012 
Cause for complete closure or severe disruption / 
Count of reporting UK port harbour masters, ranked in 
order of likelihood from 1 to 5  
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Channel blockage (accident, grounding) 6 9 2 2 3 22 16 
Poor weather/natural disaster 7 1 2 2 1 13 10 
Port infrastructure failure / breakdown 3 2 3 5 1 14 9 
Industrial action (Pilot/Tug/Port staff/Lorry drivers) 0 3 4 5 3 15 7 
Terrorism/Fire 0 2 2 2 5 11 5 
Oil pollution 1 1 2 0 1 5 3 
Other 0 0 2 1 2 5 2 
Financial collapse / loss of business 1 0 1 1 0 3 2 
Flu / Epidemic 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 
(Source: survey of 18 UK Port Harbour Masters, 2012) 
Most types of risk to the continuity of a port transcend organisational boundaries and are not managed by 
any one single organisation. Indeed, ports can be best described as a system of interdependent 
stakeholders and its geography includes: the marine and land access channels; the businesses and 
industries located around the berths and terminals; and the berths and terminals themselves. Areas of 
beauty, such as recreation parks and national parks as well as marine leisure facilities add a further 
dimension to the port’s geography (Figure 5). An event within the confines of one specific area – for 
example the sinking of a ship in the marine access channel or the destruction of a major land link (road, 
rail, pipeline) to the port – will have an impact on the functioning of the entire port system. To some 
extent, risks dependencies reach beyond the port itself and depend on wider shipping networks and 
partnering (linked) ports. For example, within the Dover-Calais system blockades in Calais by French 
fishermen and dock workers have an immediate impact on operations in Dover. 
Port systems are probably best described as complex technological and sociological environments which 
are exposed to a very diverse range of  risks. Drawing on the work of Mansouri et al. (2010) risks to a 
port might be categorised into natural disasters, organisational factors, technological factors, and human 
factors. To that one might add marine and land access factors, network factors, and economic factors. 
Figure 6 is a fishbone diagram, which was developed by reflecting on an extensive interview series within 
the UK’s port sector and the input of senior officials within the DfT. The Figure aims to show the breadth 
of risks; though it needs to be highlighted that there is a high degree of interdependency between the 
various types of risks. Moreover, organisational factors can be described as compound factors, which 
add to the impact of any port disruption – or, if well managed, such as through business continuity and 
resilience planning – act against lasting impact. 
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Figure 5: Illustrative map of the geography of a port system located on a river 
 
(Source: Authors) 
Many of the risks outlined in Figure 6 reflect upon relatively recent events, such as: the shortage of salt to 
make roads and terminals safe for operations during the icy winters of 2010 and 2011; the Icelandic 
volcanic ash-cloud incident in 2010 necessitating the closure of most of the Europe’s airspace and 
leading to the biggest maritime focused repatriations of people since Dunkirk (mostly stranded holiday 
makers); lasting destruction of cranes alongside Felixstowe’s quay after a container ship
6
 carrying 
(ironically) a load of cranes broke free in 2008; the toppling of a dock-crane at Southampton Container 
Terminal, leading to a temporary terminal closure to enable a Health and Safety investigation as well as a 
clean-up operation (which to the frustration of some shippers was during the same period that the 
destruction of cranes in Felixstowe occurred); regular near misses and marine accidents at the UK’s main 
ports, including the significant environmental disaster at Milford Haven in 1996; industrial action, such as 
blockages at fuel depots in 2007; regular heightened alertness brought about from terrorist threats; the 
current economic down-turn impacting upon the income and financial resources available to ports; 
conflicting uses of maritime space, such as the development of off-shore wind farms, amongst others. 
Continued fear of unexploded World War 2 ordnance, the 60
th
 anniversary of the big North Sea Flood in 
January 1953 and the severe North Sea tidal-surge of 5
th
 December 2013 play further on the minds of 
those concerned with safeguarding the UK’s port infrastructure. 
Most risks outlined in Figure 6 could also impact upon a multiple of UK ports. For example, a tidal surge 
in the UK similar to the “Big Tide” in 1953 is likely to have an impact along the entire North Sea coast, 
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including Grimsby and Immingham, Felixstowe and Harwich as well as all of the Thames, serving 49% of 
the UK’s imports (DfT 2009)
7
. It would also impact upon the continental North Sea ports, including 
Rotterdam and Hamburg, severely disrupting shipping networks and any alternative shipping options to 
the UK. 
While it is easy to list possible risks to the continued operations of ports, the perceptions of their impact 
will differ significantly amongst port stakeholders – and for that matter the wider public – depending who 
has most at stake. For example, a marine accident within the port’s access channel would probably be 
primarily an insurance issue for the ship-owner. For the port terminals and berths the temporary closure 
of the access channel would result in short-term loss of business until the salvage and clean-up 
operations are completed. For importers relying on that port for critical supplies the disruption will be 
more keenly felt, very likely forcing them to identify alternative sources of supply via different shipping 
routes, possibly utilising different modes of transport. It may also translate into a sustained loss of 
business where competitors with different logistics options are able to fill the gap. For particularly critical 
goods and those where businesses do not keep sufficient strategic stockpiles or inventories (e.g. coal, 
grain, winter salt, medical equipment), there are also likely to be public policy considerations, including 
rationing. For local residents any resulting pollution, such as oil-spillage, will have long term effects on the 
quality of their environment, not to mention the risk to their drinking water. It is fair to assume that 
perceptions of vulnerabilities and subsequent impact will differ significantly amongst the port’s 
stakeholders. 
Indeed, the list of participants within a port system is long and very diverse, and spreads across the port’s 
entire geography (Figure 5). Broadly, stakeholders can be grouped into those directly involved in the 
operations of the port. These have been categorised in Figure 7 under the heading “Primary 
Stakeholders” and include those involved in the operations of the berths and terminals as well as the 
maritime and land access. A second group can be labelled as “Dependent Stakeholders” and includes all 
those relying on the port in the context of land based or off-shore based economic activities, as well as 
those that provide supporting services to the port and its users. Finally, there are those “Linked 
Stakeholders”, who may not have any direct interest in the port’s operations, but are nevertheless able to 
influence port policy and operational conditions, be it through direct executive powers or by virtue of co-
location.
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 The authors are currently also involved in follow-on work to evaluate the impact of the North Sea tidal-
surge on 5
th
 December 2013 upon the UK’s ports. 
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Figure 6: Possible threats to continued port operations 
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(Source: adapted from Mansouri et al. (2010) by drawing on findings made in interviews with the UK port sector and in consultation with policy makers at the 
UK’s Department for Transport)
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Figure 7: Participants and Stakeholders in Port Operations by Grouping 
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Key-point summary 
 Ports are vulnerable and the list of potential risks is diverse and long. 
 Lack of planning will compound the impact of disruptive events (risks) upon the port 
 Risk perceptions are often informed by recent events, though long-term memory of particularly 
catastrophic events – such as the Big Flood in 1953, or increasing alertness brought about 
through perceived threats in International Terrorism, play a significant consideration, too. 
 Many stakeholders are involved in the operations of any port; their perceptions of risks are likely 
to differ significantly. 
 
3 How do ports currently prepare themselves? 
Debate about resilience in the UK appears to be largely driven by the government’s concern for 
critical national infrastructure and the preparedness of the UK’s key sectors: communications, 
emergencies services, energy, finance food, government, hazards sites, health nuclear, transport and 
water (Cabinet Office 2012).  Critical national infrastructure is defined by the UK government as 
“those infrastructure assets (physical or electronic) that are vital to the continued delivery and integrity 
of the essential services upon which the UK relies, the loss or compromise of which would lead to 
severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life”. Transport features explicitly within the 
Cabinet Office’s Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of Critical 
Infrastructure to Disruption from natural Hazards (Cabinet Office 2010). Likewise, transport 
infrastructure is also the concern of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), 
which provides advice and guidance with regards to vulnerabilities of critical national infrastructure to 
national security threats. Much of the UK government’s work is focused on regulated industries, such 
as energy, health, rail and aviation. While port and docking companies operate under powers 
conferred to them by Parliamentary Acts, ports fit uneasily under the umbrella of regulated industries 
as most stakeholders within the wider port system (Figure 7) remain largely free from any economic 
regulation. 
The main instrument at the UK government’s disposal to help foster improved resilience planning is 
the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). It provides for structured co-operation and information sharing 
between so-called Category 1 and Category 2 responders. Within the wider context of ports Category 
1 responders for England and Wales include: the Secretary of State, in so far as his functions include 
responding to maritime and coastal emergencies (excluding the investigation of accidents); the county 
and district councils; the emergency services, including HM Coast Guard; the port health authorities; 
and the Environment Agency. Category 2 responders within the context of ports are limited to the 
harbour authorities only. 
Under the Act Category 1 responders have four core duties: risk assessment, business continuity 
management (e.g. ISO22301; ISO 2012), emergency planning, and warning and informing the public. 
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Category 2 responders have the duty to cooperate, share information, and support Category 1 
responders. The principle mechanism for cooperating between Category 1 and 2 responders are the 
so called Local Resilience Forums
8
, which as part of their work may also look at their responsibilities 
towards the port industry. However, the vast majority of organisations involved in the running and 
functioning of a port (Figure 7), with the exception of the port harbour authorities, are not directly 
represented within the Category 1 and Category 2 frameworks. This raises the question of whether 
the framework of the Civil Contingency Act is suitable for the UK’s port sector and whether it needs to 
be modified (e.g. by re-categorising Category 1 and 2 members) or by setting-up supporting 
institutional mechanisms that embody all stakeholders within the wider port system and the Primary 
Stakeholders outlined in Figure 7, in particular. 
Irrespective of the Civil Contingency Act, port authorities are required by reference to Port Marine 
Safety Code to manage marine safety specific risks, such as those arising from marine accidents (DfT 
2009). Likewise, some of those organisations within the wider port system may choose to manage 
risks specific to their own business, as required by good corporate governance practice (FRC 2012). 
However, these provisions fall short of managing risks that extends across organisational boundaries 
within the wider port as illustrated in Figure 5. 
As already outlined, risks are likely to be perceived differently and will be dependent on the 
organisation’s particular commercial appetite for risk, often changing in line with economic climate and 
pressures on managing costs. A particular challenge in bringing various port stakeholders together is 
that their interests are seldom aligned, and that those organisations best placed to manage a 
particular risk may not necessarily be the most incentivised to put mitigating measures in place – or, 
for that matter, lend resource to resilience planning. The alignment of interests will ultimately have 
political dimensions and requires suitable mechanisms. 
Key-point summary 
 Resilience planning is thought to be largely driven by the respective UK government 
departments. The main instrument at the UK government’s disposal is the Civil Contingencies 
Act (2004). However, the Act’s mechanisms and institutions focus on specific individual 
organisations (especially the harbour authority), but fail to consider the many other organisations 
involved in keeping the port operational, or have an interest in resilient port operations. 
 The interests amongst port stakeholders are unaligned and those best placed to manage risks 
may currently not necessarily be suitably incentivised. The alignment of interest for the greater 
public good will require some political commitment supported by suitable mechanisms. 
 
                                                     
8
 There are a total of 43 Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in England and Wales, additional groups 
exist in Northern Ireland and Scotland (see: https://www.gov.uk/local-resilience-forums-contact-
details). In some cases, such as along the river Thames, multiple LRFs converge at the boundaries of 
a port system (Figure 5) and raising further doubts about their suitability for the port industry. 
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4 How can UK port resilience be improved? 
Probably the main challenge for policy makers tasked with fostering greater resilience in ports is the 
wide diversity in stakeholders and the fact that these are largely driven by their own commercial 
interests, which may not necessarily be aligned with wider public interests. Current regulatory 
instruments for the protection of Critical National Infrastructure and Resilience Planning are ill suited 
for ports as they fail to recognise the mechanisms necessary to help the various stakeholders within 
the wider port system (Figure 7) come together. Following ideas for Activity packages (A1-A6) might 
help improve upon the current situation: 
A1: Raise awareness and visibility about potential vulnerabilities within the port system and 
their mitigation 
Most primary stakeholders within the wider port system (Figure 7) are aware of the risks within their 
specific organisations, but not necessarily about the impact such risks might have on other 
stakeholders. Occasional workshops at national and local level can help raise awareness about risks 
that transcend organisational boundaries. 
A2: Identify scope for mitigating risks as well as plan for port system disruption and recovery 
Various options are available and should all be considered. They range from ad-hoc workshops and 
exercises to the development of dedicated institutions and tools: 
 Ad-hoc workshops and exercises (such as those run by the DfT): These might be risk 
specific, such as to explore the impact and response to a particular type of event (e.g. a tidal 
surge) in detail by bringing together relevant interest groups (Figure 7) and facilitate an 
exchange of views on impacts to their respective organisations as well as subsequent 
planning requirements. Well run workshops can help:  
 create visibility of risks across organisational boundaries 
 identify requirements for derogations from statutory requirements 
 identify spare capacity and resources in mitigation of any impact from the event 
 help identify the scale of potential disruption 
 help inform on the various workshop participants’ own business planning 
 
 Institutional approaches: Considering the range and diversity of potential risks to continued 
port operations (Figure 6) and the UK’s debendency upon the ports, it would be in the public 
interest to help foster a suitable resilience culture within the wider port sector. Rather than 
taking an ad-hoc approach as outlined in A1, more regular forums (maybe with a dedicated 
secretariat) could be set-up to help wider resilience planning. 
 
 Development and adoption of standardised planning and business continuity standards: To 
help give stakeholders within a wider port system a common framework it might be worth 
developing a common standardised framework. Inspiration may be taken from the ISO 22301 
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(formerly BS25999). The drafting and use of simple templates and checklists may (perhaps 
building on work already undertaken by the DfT) could be a good starting point. 
 
Simulation Tools: The authors of this paper are actively involved in developing a simulation tool that 
can be used to help inform upon the impact of specific events taking place as well as the outcome of 
subsequent resilience planning choices. While computer simulation helps inform upon planning 
choices, the key to successful planning relies on collaborative work between the various port 
stakeholders (Achuthan, Grainger et al. 2013). 
A3: Identify incentive mechanisms to ensure stakeholder interests are aligned with regard to 
the overall resilience of critical national port infrastructure. 
Resilience has a cost and the appetite for risk will differ significantly amongst port stakeholders. 
Further consultation and research is required in order to establish how interests might be aligned, 
especially with regard to developing appropriate incentive mechanisms. 
A4: Exchanges, field-work and case-studies 
The UK is not alone in its need for resilient infrastructure. Valuable lessons can be learnt from other 
sectors with multiple stakeholders, such as energy and health, as well as from the experiences and 
institutions in other countries, such as Japan and the USA. Likewise, exchanges in knowledge and 
experience within the UK and across Europe  are likely to be very helpful in developing awareness 
and skills, too. It would be prudent to help facilitate such activity, for example within the framework of 
European research funding and bilateral exchanges with countries that have a similar interest in port 
resilience. 
A5: Further detailed research  
 At present understanding of risk and resilience within a quantifiable cost-benefit context is 
limited. This needs to be redressed. In the absence of robust cost-benefit figures it might be 
difficult to mobilise necessary resources – unless, of course, there is an overriding political will 
 
 Within the UK, policy makers have little visibility of whether and where there might be any 
redundancy (if any) within the wider UK port sector that could be utilised in the event of an 
emergency. It would be useful to conduct some explorative studies in this area. Such 
research might look at how shipping lines may choose to re-route their vessels or how ports 
may choose to forgo certain types of traffic in favour of another. 
A6: Improve upon early warning and communication systems 
Much of the planning is dependent on the time-period available for action prior to the event. Any 
enhancement in early warning and communications capabilities significantly widens the scope of 
options in planning for resilience at UK ports. 
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